

**THE POLITICS OF URBAN CULTURAL POLICY**  
**GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES**

Carl Grodach and Daniel Silver

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## **CHAPTER 2**

### **Chicago from the Political Machine to the Entertainment Machine**

**Terry Nichols Clark and Daniel Silver**

Citizens of high and especially low status have dramatically increased their interest and participation in the arts and culture in recent years. There is apparent controversy over the point, but it mostly is a question of definition. Studies focused on the more traditional activities like classical music, opera, and museum visits find gradual declines (e.g. DiMaggio and Mukhtar 2004; National Endowment for the Arts 2009) but studies of more comprehensive sets of activities (internet downloads of electronic music, hip hop, rap, radio listening, starting your own small band or arts group) often find growth, sometimes dramatic. The French and French Canadians have done some of the best work mapping such developments (e.g. Donnat 2011). Clark and Silva (2009) document a strong rise in some 10 countries and moderate increases in 20 more in the World Values Survey over the past 20 years.

How have political leaders responded to these changes? The case of Chicago provides a valuable starting point. These processes are new, controversial, and absent in many locations. In old European cities like Paris and Berlin, culture has been a core municipal concern for centuries. The first book on Midwest US cities and towns (Longworth 2007) stresses that most are in serious decline and minimally stress culture and art.

Chicago, however, especially under the leadership of Mayor Richard M. Daley, dramatically integrated the arts and culture into its basic political repertoire. Chicago is moreover a new entrant on the stage of global cultural cities, transforming its blue collar and localist heritage. Here, the coalitions, stakeholders, and conflicts that emerge are less entrenched and more fluid, and, with the benefit of recent data, we can see how cultural and expressive concerns enter into “normal” city politics. The new combination of participants and resources powerfully document the rise of amenities and culture, contrasting with the strong tradition of jobs and contracts as classic resources, led by a political machine (Clark 2012). Chicago politicians’ traditional concern with such private goods has been joined with an emphasis on public goods like parks and art and flowers, ushering in a new political style and a new role for culture in the city.

More traditionally associated with hogs (“Chicago: Hog Butcher to the World”), clientelism (“We Don’t Want Nobody Nobody Sent,”), and industrialism (“Chicago, City of Broad Shoulders”), Chicago lacks a strong tradition of major civic and city government expenditure and interest in arts, culture, and amenities. As late as 1975, Saul Bellow wrote, “there were beautiful and moving things in Chicago, but culture was not one of them” (Bellow 1975: 69). In the wake of major investments in Chicago’s cultural infrastructure, by 2009, the Director of the National Endowment of the Arts could say: “Mayor Daley should be the No. 1 hero to everyone in this country who cares about art” (in *The Theater Loop*, 2009). In 1976, Milton Rakove described Chicago as “Dick Daley’s town. Uncultured and parochial...not an Athens, neither a Rome, nor a London, and never a Paris” (Rakove 1976: 41). In 2003 Mayor Daley II had the street level bus stops and rail entrances redesigned to match those in Paris. What happened in between, how did local politicians drive this process, and how has Chicago politics changed?

Our concern is the role of government and public policy in the cultural transformation of Chicago. This is important as most past work on urban culture and cultural policy has focused on policy and economics, a tendency encouraged by the professional standards of organizations like the International City Managers Association (ICMA, website) and its more specialized counterparts, as well as academic disciplinary specialization. In Chicago, however, power and politics are paramount. These issues may be muted elsewhere as policy actors and analysts alike attempt to frame their work as rational deliberation. By contrast, the Chicago case provides a model that allows us to see personal rivalries, ambitions, and connections that drive local policy.

The only major American city with a historically Catholic political majority, Chicago stands out for its past emphasis on clout (aka “juice”), with individual personalities vying for political power and willing to use city resources to sustain and expand political success. To this end, the vast political machine of Mayor Richard J. Daley (Daley I, 1955-1976) wielded the classic tools of patronage jobs and contracts for specific ethnicities and neighborhoods, which have been more important than class. This everyday acceptance of ethnic/national/cultural distinctiveness led to a more anthropological cultural relativism and mutual tolerance embodied in the slogan, “You deliver your precinct, and I’ll deliver mine.”

His son, Mayor Richard M. Daley (Daley II, 1989 to 2011) operated in a world where such clientelist tactics, while not extinguished, were much less effective. But the Chicago tradition of pragmatism, personalism, and localism persisted. Daley II responded to this altered landscape in a vigorous and innovative way, utilizing the arts, entertainment, parks, and amenities to build support among his new, more cosmopolitan, educated, younger, and affluent citizens. And, in

good Catholic, non-ideological form, Daley learned how to give this constituency what it wanted – flowers, theater, bike paths, green buildings, and music. Simultaneously traditional ethnic groups “got theirs”: from blues to Celtic festivals. The result is a dramatic transition, the high points of which we recount below, from the Political Machine to the Entertainment Machine.

## **DALEY I AND THE NEW SOCIAL ISSUES**

The elder Mayor Daley understood social issues as part of the New Deal legacy. For him they meant concern for the “common man,” helping the disadvantaged, providing jobs and support for basic economic needs. His speeches often included a nod of thanks to the New Deal Democratic program, the policies of which he might illustrate with a concrete example chosen for his specific audience, perhaps a hospital or an urban-renewal project for that neighborhood. Here social and fiscal issues strongly overlapped, consistent with New Deal Democratic ideology (Andersen 1979; Rundquist, Miranda, and Tunyavong 1991). Yet if he referred to the big themes of the national New Deal, “Da Mayor” did so plainly, with a grammatical eccentricity that out-of-towners sometimes found amusing. He would also never forget to thank, by name, those who had helped him in that locale, including precinct captains and aldermen. City officials reciprocated by ending their public statements with “God bless Mayor Daley.”

Though Daley I did invest in public art – for instance, the Chicago Civic Center as well as public sculptures by Picasso, Calder, and Chagall – he took a strong stand against the 1960s new social movements and their core concerns with more citizen-responsive, egalitarian, multicultural, and tolerant politics that put environmental, feminist, lifestyle and quality of life issues center stage.

He did of course “address” the new social issues in the late 1960s – with a vengeance. When the agenda of the future was paraded by picketers before the August 1968 Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Chicago, Daley’s reaction – consistent with Chicago’s common-man approach and neighborhood pride – was to call the cops and drag the protestors away. This horrified the national television and print journalists in town for the convention, who played up the conflict between the unruly protestors and the mayor.

Daley’s actions during the ‘68 DNC unwittingly sewed the seeds of some of the deepest changes in Chicago’s history. His authoritarian style sparked multiple conflicts, which brought major new developments. The general pattern of these changes can be summarized as a decline in hierarchy and a rise of more egalitarian political relations. Slowly and steadily, the picketers outside the 1968 DNC have been invited in to City Hall and their programs pursued – through visible appointments of women and minorities, a new language of multiculturalism, programs like set-asides for minorities and women contractors, and greening of the city with new trees and flowers. This is not to say that every movement has achieved its goals. The key point is that over time, as minority movement ideals become broadly majority concerns, political leaders respond to them, with major consequences for local cultural policy.

### **FRAGMENTED POWER, EMERGENT NEW ISSUES: BILANDIC AND BYRNE**

When Mayor Daley passed away in 1976, the Democratic machine began to fragment between competing interests. In fact, Michael Bilandic was selected as his replacement in large measure because “he had practically no profile of his own” (Suttles 1990: 139). His tenure was short,



marked by the steady rise of organized opposition from the media, civic groups, and rival government agencies. A fractured party meant more reliance on public support and less on party connections. In this context, the arts would prove useful politically. While weakened authority hindered his ability to accomplish all that he planned, Bilandic's greater dependence on general public approval led him to initiate several key projects including Chicago Fest, Navy Pier, and The Chicago Public Library.

Jane Byrne, even though she rose through Daley's machine, ran against Bilandic on a reform agenda. Her victory seemed to validate a cautious and uncomfortable alliance of racial minorities and reformers. But once in office, she reconverted government offices into "funnels for patronage." One of her many reversals involved Bilandic's Chicago Fest. She first sought to cancel Chicago Fest but she pragmatically and "characteristically did a 180-degree turn and adopted the event as her very own, .... [ordering] her Special Events office to come up with spectacles like it." (Davis 1995: 22). And in 1978 she started the percent for art program designating a portion of funds for new and renovated buildings to pay for public art – inspired by national examples. By requiring new buildings to have more sidewalk space, she also made possible the sidewalk cafes that expanded exponentially after her administration.

These policies all helped to enliven street life and create a downtown that is more visible to the affluent. These were centered first in the tourist and convention areas of the city, and over time broadened to such events as Chicago Fest, which in turn inspired related Lakefront festivities, typically linked with Chicago's ethnic traditions – like the Blues and Gospel Festivals, Latin Music Festivals, and Celtic Festivals. Many included free concerts by top stars in Grant Park,

and were much appreciated by low-income Chicagoans. This inaugurated a trend, actively pursued by Daley II, of using public music festivals to generate allegiance through consumption and leisure for all.

## **CULTURAL POLICY UNDER HAROLD WASHINGTON: THE CITY OF CHICAGO CULTURAL PLAN**

Jane Byrne was explicit about introducing certain issues to Chicago politics, which included issue specific women's organizations as well as a newfound emphasis on consumption and lifestyle within the city. The arts and culture, the aesthetics of street life and public festivals, were major legacies that mushroomed thereafter. But Harold Washington's victory in 1983 shook Chicago to the core. Initially a machine bit player, Washington converted to the cause of reform in large measure due to political expediency (Green and Holli 1991). His resources came almost completely from black individuals and businesses, who were traditionally separated from the broader machine structures. In addition he was elected by a diverse coalition of non-Catholics: Protestant-heritage "lakefront liberals," Hispanics, Jews, and an overwhelming majority of Chicago's African-Americans

Washington and his advisors created a reform agenda to match their seemingly prophetic rise to power. One pillar of the agenda was the formation of Chicago's Department of Cultural Affairs, and with it, its first-ever comprehensive cultural plan (CCP). The plan was a landmark document. Joining a newly prioritized attention to culture with classic Chicago themes, it aimed to incorporate culture into "all aspects of municipal planning" (CCP, website). First and

foremost, it was ambitious, stating: “The Chicago Cultural Plan is without precedent in its scope and the grassroots process by which it was crafted. It took shape from the recommendations and observations of thousands of Chicago citizens as well as hundreds of cultural, civic and community groups” (CCP, website). Second, it stressed the strong charismatic individual in typical Chicago fashion, opening the “Statement of Principles” by averring: “The individual artist is at the foundation of our cultural heritage” (CCP, website). Yet, continuing the equally strong Chicago tradition of rooting and tempering individual action in ethno-cultural soil, the plan itself is presented by its authors as an expression of the collected and multiple cultures of Chicago’s neighborhoods and ethnicities. Cultural Plan meetings were held in 65 Chicago neighborhoods and citywide meetings were held with Latino, Asian, and Native American artists as well as representatives of major downtown cultural institutions.

The Plan proposed a number of specific initiatives. These included streamlining decision-making within the Department of Cultural Affairs (DCA), strengthening its role in city governance structures and integrating into Illinois Arts Agencies; commissioning studies about the economic impact of the arts in Chicago; enhancing culture’s role in the city’s tourist attraction programs; creating cultural incubator programs; offering city buildings at reasonable rates for use by artists as well as rezoning spaces as live-work; increasing grants to arts groups; expanding the Chicago Cultural Center, and many others. The plan was and is an inspiration for many other cities.

Yet very little of the plan was implemented during Washington’s tenure. Indeed, on nearly every front, his agenda was viewed through the Chicago looking glass, as “rewarding a new set of friends and punishing a new set of enemies” (Ferman 1996: 141). Throughout his term, a group

of white machine aldermen opposed him at every turn, blocking nearly every reform that could not be implemented by executive order.

Fred Fine, the first DCA commissioner, tendered his resignation on April 8, the day after Harold Washington was reelected. To replace him, the Mayor appointed Joan Harris, the former chairwoman of the Chicago Opera Theater, who also served on the board of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, the Museum of Contemporary Arts, and Urban Gateways. Harris, as the *Chicago Tribune* reported, was “convinced that city government must remain a player, though a minor player, in funding Chicago's many nonprofit arts institutions” Her main vision was the “modest but essential” goal of “setting the tone and image for the city’s cultural aspirations” (Christiansen 1989). This is a far cry from the soaring visions of the plan; many of its aspirations were indeed ground up in the gears of the old machine. But it did provide the framework and new rules of the game for what would follow.

## **DALEY II AND THE RISE OF CULTURE**

The 1980s and 1990s marked a monumental shift in Chicago’s government, perhaps more than in all previous decades of the twentieth century combined. This bold claim may seem surprising. Was the city not governed by a mayor named Daley, as it was some fifty years earlier? The two Daleys looked and talked alike – Richard J., the legendary Boss, mayor from 1955 to 1976, and Richard M., in office from 1989 to 2010. How could they be so different?

Chicago's changes were camouflaged by an outdated image of the city, its citizens, and in particular its conservative leaders. What changed? The lifeblood of Carl Sandburg's "City of the Big Shoulders" was heavy industry, production, and growth; its citizens were mostly blue-collar. Industrial organization once followed practices of strict seniority, few pay differentials by individual achievement, and promotion from within.

Post-industrialism turns this on its head. National and global competition and precise communication permit contracting out to small firms globally. Local and "particularistic" social relations are partially replaced by more abstract and distant ones. Building on mathematical models of risk pioneered at the University of Chicago, the Board of Trade has emerged at the core of a network of futures and options markets that extends around the globe. But if the Board of Trade symbolizes Chicago's core position in global finance, we stress that the city's largest industry is no longer slaughtering, or steel production – or even finance. It is entertainment and tourism (Clark 2012 provides more statistical detail). Indeed, the most visited park in the entire United States is the Chicago Lakefront; it has far more visitors than the Grand Canyon (although many are from nearby). Often in stark contrast to their preconceptions, visitors are struck by the attractiveness of Chicago's parks, architecture, and boulevards, lined with new flowers, shrubs, benches, public art, and wrought iron fences. Chicago is a leader among US cities in devising ways to convert brownfields into usable property, which new industries and housing can use productively. Old parking lots surrounding hundreds of Chicago public schools were converted into small parks and playgrounds, and decorated in distinctive ways in the 1990s. Catering to its new "ethnicities," Chicago now hosts Lollapalooza and Pitchfork, two of the world's largest urban pop music festivals.

At the same time, Daley II sought to broaden his political base to incorporate Hispanics, African-Americans, gays, young urban professionals, environmentalists, and many other constituencies. His speeches added references to public goods like “trees, bicycle, culture, and entertainment” (Pasotti 2009; Banuelos 2009; Feron 1999). By marching in the Gay Rights Parade, he marked this new commitment. Narrower ethnic-neighborhood visions persist as does classic clientelism. But these are now complemented by a political, civic, and ecological vision of the entire region, where political leaders can work together rather than just fight. Regional civic groups like Open Lands have developed programs targeted to central city neighborhoods, many funded by local businesses.

## **CULTURAL POLICY AS PRAGMATIC POLITICS**

Daley II’s family history and personal style made him seem an unlikely candidate to institute these sweeping aesthetics and consumption-driven changes. Yet that same history made him into a shrewd politician who would not let ideology interfere with good politics. If he saw that planting flowers and consolidating Chicago’s theaters into a downtown “Broadway in Chicago” made political sense, it was because the rules of the game and the facts on the ground were changing. Important forces had been at work for some years, eroding the machine's popularity. For instance, a detailed study by Thomas Guterbock (1980) of a stalwart machine alderman on the North Side found that many residents did not care about free garbage cans or similar small material incentives.

New organizations and styles that sprang up after the 1970s had diffused more widely, from block clubs and environmental action groups to women's, gay, and other new social movements. It was essential to these groups' independent self-image that they not be dominated by a machine hierarchy, but instead be democratically and consensually run by their members. Globalization, rising cosmopolitanism, education, and media use among typical citizens heightened such concerns. While Mayor Daley II was widely seen as having been carried to office in 1989 by the regular Democratic Party this was not the case, and in a few short years, he increasingly relied on the media instead of the traditional army of precinct captains. Television coverage in the 1980s intruded into the inner sanctum of the Chicago City Hall, the Council Chambers. Visitors to Chicago would comment for instance that they knew all about that night when Mayor Washington's successor was chosen, since they had seen it on TV in Norway! This in turn increased the consciousness by the mayor and council of their worldwide audience, as non-Chicagoans became part of what sociologists call a "reference group." That is, leaders would not just ask, "what do Chicagoans think of this vote and of me," but also "what do others outside Chicago think." As world trade, tourism, and related global forces rise, they have helped change Chicago's political rules.

Media advertising and efficient service delivery increasingly drove politics in Chicago in the 1990s, and contributed to displacing the regular Democratic Party from the lives of individual citizens. If the general analytical trade-off was between the strong political party and the individual citizen, the intermediaries were the neighborhood associations. When the machine was strong, it co-opted or destroyed these (Ferman 1996). Daley II reversed this process by

elevating independent neighborhood associations. One way of signaling this was by improving neighborhood parks and sidewalks. The signs announced the change. That is, decades back, the most casual visitor to Chicago was struck by the hundreds of signs all over the city whose bottom line read “Richard J. Daley, Mayor.” Under his son, many sparkling new signs proclaim individual neighborhoods, local associations, and block clubs. These are one visible symbol of a general trend toward more “public goods” rhetoric and policies, such as crime-fighting, education, and quality of life amenities (Feron 1999; St. John 1999), together with a more neighborhood approach.

Most important for this chapter, however, is the fact that this shift led Daley to wholeheartedly embrace the notion that his new political environment required supplementing production concerns with consumption and aesthetic issues. Few of Daley’s initial public statements address these issues. The mayor discreetly added occasions like opening night theater performances to his social itinerary. It was easier to sell these types of policy in Chicago subtly. Because Mayor Daley II appealed to common Chicagoans with the style and language of his father, some cultural changes have seemed disconcerting. Take for instance the traditional white police who objected strenuously, although informally, to the mayor’s explicit emphasis on minority hiring, a multi-cultural emphasis in city programs, aesthetics, and service to citizens. Consider too shifts in Navy Pier. In earlier plans it was to be supported primarily by commercial sales to individuals, i.e. more separable goods. Harold Washington wanted it to be a more public good, a more aesthetically-driven edifice with fountains and vistas, open to pedestrians to consume freely. Indeed, Navy Pier became Chicago’s number one tourist spot, attracting millions of visitors annually after it was reconstructed in the 1990s. It joined high and low, with cotton candy vendors outside the Chicago Shakespeare Theater.




Seeking to unravel the sources driving amenities by Mayor Daley II, we interviewed such knowledgeable informants as David Doig, active in many amenity policies in the City's planning department before becoming Commissioner of Parks (see Clark 2012). Asked why, his first answer was "the mayor has been traveling, visiting places like Paris, bringing back specific ideas and policies." Alderman Mary Ann Smith became a citywide leader of aesthetic/consumption issues in the late 1990s, traveling to the West Coast and to Germany and Scandinavia to bring back slides, which she then showed to citizens. She summarized specific ideas in memos to the Mayor, who endorsed many of them, such as a campaign to add greenery to rooftops in 2000. Her assessment was that it simply took a few years at the beginning of his administration to get the more basic things in order, like a campaign against rats in alleys, and converting brownfields left by old polluting factories, before the more specifically aesthetic might take off.

If Washington started Chicago's Department Cultural Affairs (DCA), Daley pursued cultural policy with a vigor that made Chicago internationally prominent. The specifics are summarized in changes in arts and culture funding (Fig. 1). In the pre-Daley years, the DCA was the main municipal arts and culture organization. In 1989, Daley transferred the duties of festival planning and funding from the DCA to the new Mayors Office of Special Events. Daley aligned his own political reputation more closely with cultural services.

These policies are documented dramatically in budgetary commitments. We have assembled for the first time culture and arts spending by the multiple overlapping governments in the Chicago area, which shows a significant increase through the 1990s, albeit flattening around 2005. This is

**FIGURE 2.1: How Chicago Funds the Arts Under Political Leadership**



NOTE: The separate sources of arts funding join in the Total, but the jump in the Total after 2003 is due mostly just to including Parks. Earlier Parks data were not reasonably accessible. These are approximations since there are indirect costs that may be reported in other categories, like retirement.

government spending only totaled about \$80 million when we sum the City, Parks District, and related budgets. This data was complex to assemble as multiple overlapping governments support culture and the arts. The Donnelley Foundation commissioned a report on the arts and culture non-profits in the Chicago area, which found that they spent a total of some \$755 million in 2004 of which \$428 million was “unearned”. This is not far from the US average, where 13 percent of nonprofit arts agencies funds come from government (National Endowment for the Arts 2007). By contrast 52 percent of local culture is funded by local government in French cities (the Ministry of Culture provides less than 15 percent, and private contributions are almost zero.) We focus on government spending, but the private-public partnership leverages all sources. Civic leaders, foundations, and businesses are major cultural supporters, and Daley II worked with them actively on culture.

Other significant changes in policy were two revisions of the Chicago Cultural Plan in 1994, led by his “Global Culture Czar,” Lois Weisberg. First, illustrating the rising importance of neighborhood groups (rather than the Democratic Party), was a focus on development in neighborhoods as well as downtown Chicago which led the DCA to increase the number of grants through the Neighborhood Arts Program and Community Arts Assistance Program. Second, illustrating Chicago’s new global vision, the revised plan added a new section on “International Programs” aimed at international tourism. This led to the expansion of Chicago’s Sister Cities program under the DCA, as well as introducing the Chicago Artists International Program and adaptive reuse of the historic Water Tower as an international visitor welcome center. This was supported by civic groups like Global Chicago.

## **MILLENNIUM PARK AND THE CHICAGO WAY OF CULTURAL POLICY**

The most dramatic new amenity in Chicago, however, was clearly Millennium Park. It is critical here for several reasons. It was promoted as “Chicago’s Eiffel Tower,” it redefined the city’s global image, it was a huge ambitious project where public and private resources joined culture in new ways.

The site of Millennium Park was once a drab field adjacent to Grant Park. Now it is a cultural meeting place and global destination. What is striking about Millennium Park from a user’s perspective is how its public arts are used by Chicagoans from all backgrounds and neighborhoods. “The Crown Fountain” by James Plensa features rotating giant images of typical Chicagoans. Every five minutes or so they open their mouths and out gushes water. On hot summer days, children of all types gather underneath waiting for the fountain to spit. “Cloudgate” aka “The Bean” by Anish Kapoor – a giant highly polished stainless steel object shaped like a kidney bean – reflects the city to the viewer in an infinite regress of images, encouraging a view of the city and its residents as in process, flux, and formation – a far cry from the classic images of stability, locality, and familiarity.

The central attractions in Millennium Park all bear the names of their private donors: The Jay Pritzker Pavillion, Boeing Galleries, Harris Theatre for Music and Dance, and Mc Donald’s Cycle center. Donations, along with revenues generated by the below-ground parking garage, were key to building the Park, as Daley promised to do so without spending a dime of taxpayer

money. Timothy Gilfoyle (2006) has documented the inner workings of the massive project. Upholding this “no-taxpayer-money” commitment was one of Daley’s primary political concerns and a way of avoiding criticism, especially from the *Chicago Tribune*. Site choice was another way to avoid opposition: Millennium Park was built in a traditionally non-residential area, limiting opposition, since no vocal community groups existed.

To coordinate Millennium Park’s “aesthetic enhancements,” Daley tapped John Bryan, CEO of Sara Lee, as his key fund-raiser and civic leader. Bryan was an ideal choice – respected by the Chicago corporate elite, he also had strong ties to Chicago’s major cultural institutions as Chair of the Art Institute and a Trustee and the University of Chicago. Bryan also had a track-record of success, raising more money for renovations to Chicago’s Lyric Opera and Orchestra Hall than had ever been donated by a business community for a local cultural project (Gilfoyle 2006). At the same time, Bryan was a prime representative of the new social issues, with a reputation for having broken down gender and racial barriers within Sara Lee (Gilfoyle 2006). These specifically aesthetic, social, and lifestyle concerns gave Bryan considerable clout with local environmental and neighborhood groups. This stated goal of sustainability and environmentalism reduced the desire or need for interest groups to oppose the projects (Stevenson 2007). At the same time, the star power of Frank Gehry – “acquired” by the Pritzker family’s efforts – was enough to keep the civic group Friends of the Park from invoking Chicago’s historic ordinances against buildings in its lakefront park space. Here we see masters in the culture of clout at work, applying old tricks within the new rules and among the new local actors.

Bryan was able to raise over \$230 million for the project. In a 21<sup>st</sup> century cultural version of

Chicago-style neighborhood/personal politics, he divided up the space into a series of regions (i.e. neighborhoods). Donors were given considerable input into the art and design of their particular spaces, and, more or less, Daley gave Bryan free-reign in this process. This gave the Park that very pluralistic patchwork feel distinctive of Chicago's broader mosaic of neighborhoods. Furnari (2010) shows in network analyses how they divided along aesthetic lines, some more civic/citizen-engaged, others more physical/garden oriented, even while collaborating. Each brought distinct resources: money, contacts, new public art objects, and multi-use buildings combined synergistically.

The list of donors includes many prominent Chicagoans, including Oprah Winfrey. Though the financial coalition was diverse, most gifts came from the finance sector and Chicago's old-guard industrial corporations – that is, from outside traditional growth machine interests like real estate and development. What held this group together, led by Bryan, was their shared membership in most of Chicago's philanthropic, civic, and artistic boards. Indeed, the arts groups in Chicago join many of its top business leaders, who see each other at dinners, fund raisers, symphonies, art shows. Though clearly these leaders were concerned with growth, they were also motivated to create a world-class facility that would push aesthetic boundaries, while Daley was interested in harnessing their connections, talents, and resources to stamp his name on a revitalized and more inviting, open, and multi-cultural downtown. The specific policy and funding decisions they made featured pro-environment, openly participatory, cultural goals. Before Millennium Park, the most dramatic joining of these was Richard Franke's Chicago Humanities Festival, downtown, on and off campus at the University of Chicago.

In Chicago, one can find, as in the past, more narrow, open business conflicts, such as between new gondoliers and older barge haulers in the Chicago River, where Mayor Daley II mediated and encouraged a view that the river should be open to all users. How many mayors can speak of diversity with these two as examples? What could be a sharper marker that culture has been “institutionalized” into the normal life of normal Chicago politics? And Daley quipped further that he hoped the Chicago River would soon have more excitement than the Seine. New rhetoric, impossible in old Chicago, which would have blushed at any comparison to Gay Paree.

## **CONCLUSION: CULTURAL POLICY IS A POLITICAL OUTCOME**

Over the last half century, culminating in Daley II, Chicago’s leaders have thus increasingly adopted policies that reflect three changes: more public goods, more managed growth, and more amenities. The Chicago case is thus ideal for highlighting the deeply political character of cultural policy, which analysts and policy-makers all too often misrepresent as a pure exercise in non-political planning.

Indeed, Chicago machine politicians were masters of the political sphere, sending precinct captains into neighborhoods in order to know what their clients wanted. The new entertainment machine continues these practices, but also on a different, expressive, level. Chicago is now host to not only ethnically-rooted music festivals like the Blues or Celtic festivals, but Lollapalooza and the indie music Pitchfork Festival. If Daley I’s power hinged on skilled precinct captains who knew what their people wanted, Daley II inaugurated a style of power that hinges on skilled cultural affairs officers sensitive to what indie music fans, environmental activists, jazz aficionados, and foodies like, plus other elements of an increasingly differentiated and refined

domain of consumption. Fleury (2007:180) shows that sensitive managers similarly built the Beaubourg Center into a powerful scene, by so engaging participants, that citizenship is experienced as an identity in public space. Beaubourg attracts over five times the number of visitors as the Eiffel Tower. Chicago's Millennium Park in this respect is closer to Beaubourg than the Eiffel Tower in joining multiple cultural events in adjacent public spaces, from sculpture to ice skating to opera. New mayor Rahm Emmanuel has made producing a new Cultural Plan one of his first and most publically broadcast policy goals, with new support for local and neighborhood musicians and music venues reportedly at its center.

The news is that citizens are no longer (only) moving to the Paris Latin Quarter or New York's Greenwich Village to find the arts. You can now stay in Iowa City. There are all sorts of artistic, bohemian, colorful, and diverse neighborhoods in small and mid sized towns across the US and elsewhere. These are entertainment machines of a new sort that work alongside the traditional growth machines. Analysts and policy makers can learn from the Chicago case: how cities with weak cultural traditions can dramatically transform themselves, without violence, in more profound ways than some nations where elites have proclaimed Revolution.

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