God, Yoga, and Karate

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We investigate the location patterns of organizations that embody key religious-spiritual traditions and that have grown to prominence in the latter 20th and early 21st centuries: evangelical churches, yoga, and martial arts. The distribution of key cultural organizations depends on the degree to which they are able to frame themselves in relation to one another and to core American traditions. Organizations associated with the American religious divide are more polarized in their social appeal and spatial distributions, and those framed as broadly neutral elements of popular culture are more widely distributed. Using a national database of local amenities, we find that theologically conservative churches are popular in many neighborhoods but concentrated in less-educated and nonwhite areas. Yoga studios are less geographically dispersed and more spatially concentrated in college-educated and white areas. Compared to these, martial arts schools, sports clubs, and other pop-culture amenities are more widely distributed across different types of areas.

Keywords: religion, yoga, martial arts, cultural divide, popular culture.

INTRODUCTION

In the past half-century, American Christians have both restructured along left-right lines (Wuthnow 1988; Hunter 1991) and become part of a diverse spiritual panoply (Warner 1993). This article discusses how religious pluralism relates to the left-right divide, and to other societal cleavages. In some cases, newer spiritual options are considered antithetical to orthodox Christianity and reinforce social cleavages along religion, race, and class. In other cases, various practitioners find common ground and develop cross-cutting ties across societal cleavages. A critical factor, we argue, is the willingness and ability of practitioners to define themselves in relation to one another and to core (but evolving) American traditions.

We theorize that organizations associated with the left-right cultural divide are more polarized in their social appeal and spatial distributions, and that organizations framed (Goffman 1974) as broadly neutral elements of popular culture are more widely distributed across different types of areas. To test our claims, we analyze a national database of local organizations, focusing on three organizational types that embody key religious-spiritual traditions: evangelical churches, yoga, and martial arts. We find that theologically conservative churches are popular in many neighborhoods but concentrated in less-educated and nonwhite areas. Organizational types framed as oppositional alternatives to conservative Christianity, e.g., yoga studios, are less geographically dispersed and more spatially concentrated in college-educated and white areas. Compared to these, martial arts, sports clubs, and other pop-culture amenities are more widely distributed across different types of areas.

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We qualify our findings by noting that processes of framing are continually constructed and contested. To the extent that Christians and yogis find common ground and shared activities, they are more likely to overcome mutually negative stereotypes and to reach diverse races, classes, and religious sensibilities. The location of key organizations in contemporary American culture, as reflected in spatial patterns, remains complex and contingent.

**Religious and Cultural Divide**

American scholars mostly agree that the 20th century has seen a “fundamental restructuring of the religious field around a major left/right cleavage that runs through, not between, denominational families” (Edgell 2012). On the right (orthodox) side of the religious and cultural divide, claims Hunter (1991:44), are those committed to an “external, definable and transcendent authority . . . that defines, at least in the abstract, a consistent, unchangeable measure of value, purpose, goodness, and identity.” On the left (progressive) side are found those defined by the modern spirit of rationalism and subjectivism, for whom truth claims remain flexible (Hunter 1991:44). Since the 1990s, the left is increasingly populated by those who eschew religious identification altogether, the so-called “nones” (Putnam and Campbell 2010:132).¹

Even as Americans restructure along left-right lines, they also find an increasingly plural religious-spiritual landscape, what Eck (2002) heralds as the “World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation.” In one perspective, this pluralism engenders new forms of spirituality that reinforce the cultural divide, as they are embraced by the cultural left (or counterculture) as superior alternatives to hierarchical, dogmatic religion (Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Bender 2010). Cultural division and pluralism also overlap with race, income, and education. Cultural progressives tend to be younger, college-educated, higher-income, and non-Hispanic whites, and pursue a variety of exotic, authentic cuisines, arts, music, and spiritual practices often concentrated in more “bohemian” and economically dynamic cities and neighborhoods (Florida 2012).² Less-educated and nonwhite persons stick to more traditional religion (Stroope 2011; Hout, Fischer, and Chaves 2013), family restaurants and other familiar fare (Alderson, Junisbai, and Heacock 2007; Fischer and Mattson 2009:444), and tend to be residentially segregated from more-educated and white Americans.³

The processes of religious restructuring and pluralization, therefore, may contribute to two distinct clusters of Americans, socially and spatially: one tending to be less traditionally religious, more attracted by alternative “spirituality” and expressive culture, more educated, white, and concentrated in economically “creative” regions; the other religiously traditionalist, less educated, heavily black and Hispanic, and living in economic hinterlands.

¹An interesting effect of religious restructuring and pluralization is that the descriptive term “religious” is rejected as narrow and problematic by many “nonreligious” adherents of progressive perspectives and alternative metaphysical beliefs and practices. They would prefer broader terms such as cultural (e.g., cultural left) or spiritual. In our article, the terms religious, cultural, and spiritual are often interchangeable or used in combination (e.g., religious-cultural divide, religious-spiritual pluralism).

²Education and age are the variables most consistently associated with religious views (Wuthnow 1996:317). Respondents who are younger, college educated, living in Pacific or Mountain states, politically liberal, and whites are more likely to eschew religious affiliation (Hout, Fischer, and Chaves 2013; also see Putnam and Campbell 2010:122–33).

³Fischer and Mattson (2009) and Reardon and Bischoff (2011) discuss recent trends in residential segregation: racial segregation is somewhat narrowing while segregation by income and education is increasing.
While one literature highlights divisions along religiosity, race, income, and education, another stresses the assimilation of many groups to American popular and democratic culture. Most Christians embrace the values of democracy, moderation, and tolerance (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Wolfe 1998). Practitioners of various non-Christian traditions adapt to a religious-civic marketplace that valorizes individual choice, entrepreneurial leaders, and voluntary congregations (Warner 1993:1067–68; Warner and Wittner 1998). Finally, diverse practitioners operate in the context of a popular and mass culture, which synthesizes and markets elements from many ethnic, religious, and cultural traditions for heterogeneous audiences (cf. Lizardo 2006; Zelizer 1999). Contemporary “pop” music draws persons across the class and occupational spectrum, including highly educated highbrow aficionados (Peterson and Kern 1996). Similarly, “big-box” stores stock a wide variety of items, from Jesus candles to yoga mats, devotional books to organic foods. Fast-food restaurants offer all types of “ethnic” and hybrid foods, including Korean tacos, as well as lattes and Tuscan salads. In some businesses, sports knowledge leads to more extensive personal networks than does knowledge of high culture (Erickson 1996). Popular culture creates extensive personal networks with weak ties that cut across many social boundaries (Lizardo 2006).

This relatively open democratic and popular culture permits creative entrepreneurs (suppliers) to sometimes find areas of profitable synthesis between different traditions. Brooke Boon, a conservative Christian, founded and marketed “Holy Yoga,” including 475 certified instructors in 10 countries (Brown 2013a:45–6). Another Christian, Billy Blanks, created the popular exercise program Tae-Bo, a portmanteau of Tae Kwon Do and boxing. American consumers, in turn, mostly tolerate and often embrace this experimentation with multiple beliefs and practices (Brown 2013a; Syman 2010). An estimated 38 percent of Americans use “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM), such as yoga, chiropractic, acupuncture, and martial arts (Brown 2013a:1–2), which broadly assume some form of metaphysical life force or energy. CAM is popular across the religious divide: evangelical Christians sometimes appear even more enthusiastic than the general population about these practices, if not yoga, then certainly chiropractic, martial arts, and some others (Brown 2013a:Ch. 3).

Theory of Cultural Framing

The literature offers diverging views and examples of the relationship between spiritual pluralism and societal cleavages. Yet it largely lacks a theoretical statement as to why and how specific religious-spiritual options correlate with particular social divisions and spatial distributions. Why do some culturally significant organizations generate sufficient commitment from local residents to sustain a physical, institutional presence in some neighborhoods but not others? The spatial distribution of key organizations, we theorize, depends at least partly on how they are “framed” by the larger society. Organizations associated with the left-right cultural divide are more polarized in their social appeal and spatial distributions; those framed as broadly neutral

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4In a study of American teenagers, Smith and Denton (2009:31, 82) find that only 2.8 percent of teens overall and 2–3 percent of Christian teens affiliate with more than one religious-spiritual option. However, the authors, and their teen respondents, define religion and spirituality much more narrowly than Brown (2013a), excluding popular practices such as acupuncture, chiropractic, and yoga. The huge gulf between Smith and Denton’s 3 percent and Brown’s 38 percent again highlights the centrality of framing. Only .1 percent of Americans identify as Hindus, for example, but a much larger 6–9 percent participate in the Hindu-originated practice of yoga.

5Goffman (1974:21) defines “frames” broadly as “schemas of interpretation” that enable individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences within their life space and the world at large. By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and to guide action, whether individual or collective.
components of popular culture show broader appeal and distributions. We elaborate with a brief history of conservative churches, yoga, and martial arts in the United States.

**Conservative Churches: Racial Bridging, Cultural Divide**

Conservative or evangelical Protestant organizations that stress obedience to biblical scripture were a mainstay of American civic and popular culture, from the revivalist George Whitefield in the early 18th century to Billy Graham in the mid-20th (Bellah et al. 1996; Emerson and Smith 2000; Wuthnow 2003). Since the 1960s, Christian churches increasingly proselytize to all races and classes. Evangelical congregations are more likely to bring together members across economic (Putnam 2000:77) and racial lines (Putnam and Campbell 2010:296) than are liberal-moderate, mainline Protestants (but see Emerson and Smith 2000).

Yi (2009; Yi and Graziul 2012) finds that racial diversity is particularly robust among theologically conservative congregations that are not affiliated with the historically major (“old-line”) denominational families (e.g., Baptist, Methodist). Many of these “new line” conservative (or “New Con,” as we call them) congregations (e.g., Apostolic Faith, International Churches of Christ) establish branches in inner-city neighborhoods and actively recruit diverse racial and economic groups see (also Martin 2008). They often include enthusiastic or charismatic worship styles that break down traditional social norms about who should associate with whom (Dougherty and Huyser 2008; Marti 2009).

While conservative Christian churches have experienced some success in bridging racial divides, reaching out to America’s most-educated persons has proved more difficult. Evangelicals are associated with the divide between the 1960s counterculture and the post-1980s religious right; they are often critiqued as “judgmental, homophobic, hypocritical, and too political,” overly focused on rules rather than spirituality (Putnam and Campbell 2010:121). Disenchantment fuels the growth of Americans, especially younger, college-educated, nonsouthern, politically liberal, and whites, who eschew religious affiliation (Hout, Fischer, and Chaves 2013).

These historical trajectories have clear implications for the spatial distribution and residential communities associated with New Con churches, which we summarize in the form of a testable proposition:

**H1:** Neighborhoods with many New Con churches should have (a) higher levels of overall racial diversity; (b) higher nonwhite shares of the local population; and (c) lower college graduate shares of the population.

**Yoga Contested: Post-Christian or Health and Fitness**

Significantly, many persons disaffected from the religious right do not join the religious left (e.g., the Unitarian Church), but drop out of formal religion altogether. The rise of the “nones” does not necessarily imply a decline in religious beliefs; very few of the nones claim to be atheists or agnostics (Putnam and Campbell 2010:126). Rather, the decline of formal religious participation may reflect and reinforce a broadening sense of the contingency of any

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6“Conservative” Christian broadly refers to theologically conservative groups that include evangelicals (as defined by Steensland et al. 2000), but also Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other groups (Smith 1990). For the Protestant churches in our analysis, the terms “evangelical” and “conservative” are interchangeable. The terms “congregation” and “church” are also interchangeable.

7Among non-Hispanic whites, Catholics (58 percent) and New Con church members (57 percent) are nearly twice as likely as members of mainline (32 percent) and Baptist (34 percent) denominations to report that their congregations are racially diverse. Racially diverse means that 75 percent or less of the members are the same race (Yi and Graziul 2012).
given religious orientation and a proliferating variety of spiritual-ethical options (Taylor 2002). New spiritual movements, moreover, have not been equally distributed spatially; they have often emerged in distinct communities and localities, with some able to radiate their practices further outward than others. Not only when but also where and among whom alternative institutions appear helps to determine the direction of religious restructuring. To illustrate the role of framing in these processes, we discuss two of the most popular Asian transplants, yoga and martial arts, first the more contested yoga and second the more neutrally framed martial arts.

For more than a century, practitioners of Indian yoga-related philosophies have interacted with American culture. One influential model was as an alternative, even oppositional, option to orthodox Christianity. In the late 19th century, influential New England literati and the Transcendentalist movement (e.g., Emerson, Thoreau) criticized organized, predominantly Calvinist, religion as overly stressing the sinfulness of man, and turned to alternative religious-ethical traditions that valorized the inherent goodness of people and nature, including Hindu Vedic philosophies (Bender 2010:106–12; Syman 2010:Ch. 1).

This oppositional tradition continued and expanded in the next century. With the massive growth of higher education in the mid-20th century, large numbers of educated, white middle-class Americans partly or wholly rejected the WASP establishment embodied in the “mainline” Christian denominations. The “counterculture” turned to and expanded the expressive tradition from William James to Abraham Maslow, in the form of a spirituality grounded in the primacy of individual experience and enlightenment (Bellah et al. 1996:32–33; Bender 2010; Heelas 1996). Emergent representatives of “the new age” combined an eclectic mix of traditions, especially from Asia, such as Zen Buddhism, Hindu yoga, meditation, and metaphysics. Syman (2010:8) describes yoga as the most popular of the spiritual options and claims that it “has augured a truly post-Christian, spiritually polyglot country.”

While numerous Americans embrace (or oppose) yoga as “post-Christian,” many yoga practitioners studiously avoid any entanglement with culture war imagery. They portray yoga as religiously neutral—neither Christian nor anti-Christian—and as compatible with American popular culture, including its tradition of individual betterment and entrepreneurship. This includes the first influential Hindu teacher in the United States, Swami Vivekananda, who was more interested in raising followers and funds than in critiquing Christianity (Syman 2010:38).

The spiritual heirs of Vivekananda include large numbers of yogis, who insist that their practices are not a religious alternative to Christianity and aspire to mainstream American society. Such practitioners (mostly of the physical postures strain of Hatha) place more emphasis on health and fitness and less on New Age spirituality than do other “mind-body-spirit” practices (Oh and Sarkisian 2012:301). Yoga as health and fitness was the prevailing model when disseminated in the mass media, such as by Richard Hittleman (1927–1991) (Syman 2010:236–38) or medical doctor Dean Ornish, and market research indicates that a majority of current practitioners were motivated to undertake yoga to improve general health (Yoga Study 2012). The focus on health and well-being, as opposed to esoteric religiosity, contributes to the appeal of yoga to a broader audience, especially among mainline Christians. More than 40 percent of Boston-area yoga practitioners reported belonging to one of the Judeo-Christian faiths (Oh and Sarkisian 2012:311).

The ongoing synthesis of yoga with mainstream American and Christian culture allows it to potentially be more financially and culturally accessible to lower-income and religiously conservative Americans. However, these efforts are sometimes hampered by persisting images of yoga as antithetical to orthodox Christianity, not only among New Agers but also among religious conservatives. In 2003, the Vatican and the Southern Baptist Convention flatly rejected New Age beliefs and practices, including some forms of yoga (Stammer 2003). Mark Driscoll, pastor of Seattle’s Mars Hill megachurch, denounced yoga as “demonic,” arguing that it is impossible to disconnect yoga’s pantheistic spirituality from its physical techniques (Driscoll 2011). Some 32 percent of yoga practitioners started yoga out of a desire for “spiritual development” (Yoga
Study 2012) and extended practice, some suggest, tends to more deeply internalize yoga’s “religious meanings” (Brown 2013a:19).

Yoga’s disputed status informs vocal debates over its incorporation into the public schools. A 2013 legal battle in Encinitas, California pitted supporters who emphasized the health/fitness benefits for children, such as physical exercise, mindfulness, and stress relief, against opponents (including the National Center for Law and Policy, a conservative Christian legal defense organization) for whom the practice was intrinsically religious and hence not a permissible part of a public school curriculum (Brown 2013b).

Enduring images of yoga as indelibly marked by its religious origins or bound up with esoteric New Age practices are a cultural mechanism that reduces its acceptance among conservative Christians. Much of the material and human resources of religious conservatives in low-income neighborhoods, from church basements to volunteers, become less likely to be available to yoga entrepreneurs looking to expand their operations. Moreover, blacks and Hispanics, and less-educated Americans, are more religiously conservative and thus less likely to demand “New Age” activities. That is, in less-educated and nonwhite neighborhoods, yoga tends to lack both supply (teachers) and demand (students). Indeed, market research claims that yoga practitioners in the USA, numbering around 15 million, are disproportionately high income (44 percent earn more than $75,000 annually), younger (72.2 percent between ages of 18 and 44), and college educated (71.4 percent) (Yoga Study 2008).\(^8\) The contested status and demographic profile of yogis in the USA suggest the following spatial distribution of yoga studios:

**H2:** Yoga studios should exhibit relatively low spatial overlap with conservative Christian churches.

**H3:** Yoga studios should be less evenly geographically distributed and more spatially concentrated than New Con churches. Neighborhoods with high numbers of yoga studios should be less racially diverse than those with New Con churches, and higher shares of their local populations should be white and have college degrees.

**Karate: Bridging the Cultural Divide**

Many Christians and yogis seek to move beyond their demographic bases and reach out to all people. However, their appeal to certain groups is often limited by the cultural images they evoke. By contrast, one organizational type that has expanded to many areas of American society is Asian-style martial arts. From its militarist, masculine roots among soldiers and other young males, martial arts have expanded across gender, racial, and economic boundaries (Guthrie 1995; Krucoff 1999; Yi 2009).\(^9\) Market research (SFIA 2013) estimates nearly 7 million Americans participated in martial arts in 2007, of which 5.5 million were core participants (at least 13 sessions). Fetto’s (2003) participation estimate is higher (around 18 million) and suggests that adult practitioners are slightly more male (52 percent) and younger (63 percent between ages 18 and 34), and that blacks are slightly more likely than whites or Asians to engage in martial arts, with 7 percent reporting participation in the past year compared to 5 percent of whites or Asians.

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\(^8\) Heelas and Woodhead’s (2005) estimate is that between 5 and 20 million Americans are active in the “holistic milieu,” with yoga being the most common practice. Birdee et al.’s (2008) analysis of the 2002 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) Alternative Medicine Supplement finds similar demographic patterns for yoga practitioners: mostly higher-income, highly educated, white women. Oh and Sarkisian’s (2012) survey of about 350 Boston-area “mind-body-spirit” practitioners (a third of them involved in yoga) found a similar makeup, with more Asian-Americans and even higher educational levels (around 90 percent holding a college degree, and 70 percent of yoga practitioners holding postgraduate degrees).

\(^9\) The “arts” are defined as “various forms of self-defense, usually weaponless, based on techniques developed in ancient China, India, and Tibet” (Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed., 2003).
Ethnographic and theoretical research points toward the bridging potential of martial arts. Yi (2009) finds that martial arts clubs draw men and women of all races, religions, educational levels, and ages, and inspire quasi-religious experiences of conversion and rededication to hard work and commitment in many members’ professional and personal lives. Drawing on Simmel’s theory of the integrative dimensions of conflict, Levine (2004, 2007) theorizes that the Japanese martial art of aikido makes antagonisms the basis of social bonds, actively encouraging the transformation of social divides into opportunities for new connections and dialogue.

The bridging potential of martial arts, we suggest, is rooted in the fact that martial arts resonate at both ends of the American cultural spectrum but (by and large) conflict with neither. Like Christianity and yoga, martial arts offer disciplined structures, charismatic teachers, and conceptions of supernatural, cosmic energy (ki/chi). In contrast to yoga, however, martial arts in America have been less strongly framed by religious conservatives as an oppositional alternative to the biblical tradition. A few evangelicals vocally criticize the “Eastern” tradition of martial arts, but their criticisms are drowned out by a much larger, committed contingent of “Christian Martial Artists,” convinced that martial arts are an excellent instrument for Christ. They include “The Champions for Christ” karate team at Bob Jones University and Tae Kwon Do-teaching missionaries at the Campus Crusade for Christ (Brown 2013a:87). Christian martial artists, such as Carlos Ray “Chuck” Norris, enjoy much more support from the evangelical establishment than do Christian yogis.

The history of martial arts in America helps explain this positive cultural framing. Martial arts largely entered the USA through the American military, an institution warmly embraced by heartland evangelicals, black and white (cf. Moskos and Butler 1996). U.S. military bases in East Asia exposed soldiers to the Asian martial arts, and helped create the first generation of American practitioners (Krucoff 1999). Chuck Norris learned the Korean art of Tang Soo Do when he was stationed at Osan Air Base, South Korea, in 1958. Martial arts retained the support of male evangelicals, even as it expanded to women, children, and all educational strata. Blacks and Hispanics, and less-educated Americans, demand quality martial arts training, as do whites and the more educated. A major constraint in low-income areas is a limited supply of high-quality, low-cost classes. Fortunately, martial arts draw on the material and human resources of religious conservatives, employing church basements and committed volunteers. Many Christians offer low-cost or free classes to low-income students (Yi 2009:136-37).

The broad appeal of martial arts suggests that as organizations become clearly framed as outsiders to the post-1960 cultural divide—neither explicitly Christian nor anti-Christian—they are more likely to be included in the broader, contemporary popular culture. The movie and television industries use martial arts as vehicles for stories of personal redemption and empowerment (e.g., The Karate Kid). Under the frame of health and exercise (Binder 2007), martial arts have become a regular part of the curriculum in park districts, public schools, and even the basement of the U.S. Capitol building, where Tae Kwon Do Grandmaster Jhoon Rhee has trained 350 members of Congress of both parties for over 45 years (Pergram 2010).

Both Levine and Yi base their theories of martial arts’ bridging potential on intensive study of a few cases. To our knowledge, no large-N extensive research tests whether empirical generalizations consistent with these theories find support in observed social relations. Yet if martial arts do indeed represent a demanding yet popularly accessible practice capable of inspiring personal transformation, they should evince a broad appeal that manifests in clubs across all types of neighborhoods. Hence our hypothesis:

\textbf{H4:} Martial arts clubs should be more strongly correlated with yoga studios and New Con churches than each is with the other. Neighborhoods with martial arts clubs should average lower population shares of white and college-educated persons than should neighborhoods with yoga studios, but higher shares than neighborhoods with New Con churches.
Biblically conservative churches have been historically integral to American popular culture, and martial arts are framed as nonoppositional to traditional Christianity, compared with yoga. Therefore, we posit that conservative (or New Con) churches and martial arts are more likely than yoga to be more strongly correlated with key popular culture amenities, such as fast-food restaurants, movie theaters, and sports and recreation centers.

H5: New Con churches and martial arts should be more strongly correlated with mainline churches and popular culture amenities than should yoga.

In sum, we theorize that the spatial proliferation of key cultural organizations depends at least partly on the degree to which they are able to frame themselves in relation to one another and to core American traditions. We hypothesize that organizations more associated with the American religious divide, such as theologically conservative churches and yoga studios, would be more polarized in their social appeal and spatial distributions. Conservative churches would be more common in areas with less-educated and nonwhite persons who tend to be religiously conservative than in areas with more-educated and white persons more likely to be in tune with the counterculture. Yoga studios would show the reverse pattern. In contrast, as organizations become more clearly framed as broadly neutral components of popular culture, they should become less associated with America’s sociospatial divisions.

**DATA AND METHODS**

We use a national data set of local organizations to examine our propositions. The data set is composed of online business directory listings (often called “Yellow Pages”) and includes a total of approximately 1.7 million organizations, about 40 per U.S. zip code, and some 380 different categories of organizations. This database contains fine-grained location information about many types of organizations that provides useful indicators for measuring our main organizations of interest: dozens of types of churches, yoga studios, martial arts clubs, and a host of popular and entertainment organizations like sports clubs, big-box stores, and fast-food restaurants. Merged with sociodemographic information from the U.S. Census, these data give us an opportunity to assess where key strands of American cultural life are located and who tends to live in these places. The U.S. Census of Business also provides national information about local organizations, a more complete accounting, and uses a more clearly defined codification scheme. But it lacks refined information about various types of churches (it only includes a listing for “religious organizations”) and does not contain key organizations like yoga and martial arts. Online business directories, while less accountable to bureaucratic and administrative standards, are more responsive to consumer interests. Despite its limitations, business directory information provides broad geographic coverage with relatively high levels of differentiation. On balance, the business directory data seem appropriate for our research questions; their national scale brings into view broad patterns of local overlap and division that elude other available data sources; their large \( N \) renders statistical estimates more reliable and less biased by minor variations; their face validity and overall consistency with prior research emerges in the analysis. Still, as digitization continues apace and new “big data” sources become available, new possibilities for evaluating

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10 The data set was compiled in 2005–2006 as part of the Cultural Amenities Project at the University of Chicago Cultural Policy Center, and is available upon request from the corresponding author. Our use of data on local organizations builds on a tradition of research into local amenities and community characteristics. Economists were pioneers in this area, often focusing on natural amenities like warm weather and clean air. Sociologists have more recently started seriously analyzing amenities, often highlighting local organizations like operas, cafes, and day-care providers, as well as the “scene” created by a place’s overall amenity mix (Silver, Clark, and Navarro 2010 review this literature).
and extending our analysis of the shifting patterns of the American religious-cultural landscape are likely to emerge.

Our main variables of interest come from the business directory database. Yoga studios and martial arts clubs are measured by their listings: “yoga instruction” and “martial arts instruction.” Our pop culture index sums six items: fast-food restaurants, sports bars, music stores, movie theaters, sports and recreation facilities, and warehouse and superstores (Cronbach’s alpha = .70).

To measure New Con churches, we summed for every U.S. zip code the total number of 11 different types of churches: Pentecostal, nondenominational, Bible, Apostolic, Assembly of God, Church of Christ, Full Gospel, Seventh-Day Adventist, Church of God, and Church of the Nazarene (Cronbach’s alpha = .80). The 11 types are also the only homogeneously conservative listings in the Yellow Pages database; by contrast, Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, and Presbyterian include both conservative (evangelical) and more liberal (mainline) strains.

We construct three other variables from business directories to provide additional, comparative context for our main variables of interest (New Con, yoga, martial arts, pop culture): Catholic churches, Baptist churches, and a (mostly) mainline index. “Catholic” and “Baptist” are separate Yellow Pages categories. “Baptist” includes mostly conservative Southern Baptists and black Baptist churches, but also some liberal, mainline Baptists; we do not analyze it in either the mainline or New Con indexes but as a separate variable. A third additional variable is a (mostly) mainline index, which adds five types of churches: Lutheran, Presbyterian, Episcopal, Methodist, and United Church of Christ (Cronbach’s alpha = .60). While most Lutheran, Methodist, and Presbyterian congregations belong to mainline denominations, some belong to evangelical ones; directory listings do not allow us to distinguish between mainline or evangelical strains. Still, as we see below, the mainline index does seem to capture mostly mainline congregations, and the different distributions of the mainline and New Con indexes are consistent with their tapping into different aspects of American religious culture. While New Con, yoga, martial arts, and pop culture are our primary analytical focus, these additional variables provide useful supplementary information.

The U.S. Census provides data useful for examining the educational and racial levels and recent trends of localities in which our organizational variables are typically located. We start from 2000 to provide a baseline for historic levels and then also analyze changes from 2000 to 2010 to assess the importance of recent demographic trends for the location of these organizations. Specifically, we investigate their associations with non-Hispanic whites and bachelor’s degree holders, analyzing (a) their percentage of the 2000 zip code population; and (b) the difference between the 2000 percentage and 2010 percentage of the zip code population (e.g., non-Hispanic whites going from 80 to 70 percent of the population between 2000 and 2010). As the Census discontinued its “long form” in 2010, for bachelor’s degree holders we use the 2008–2012 American Community Survey estimates. To show longer-term patterns, we sometimes show

11Our indicators of yoga and martial arts studios are businesses that explicitly define themselves by those labels, rather than, for instance, as “sports and recreation facilities,” which may include both. Thus, we may be measuring more “devotionally” framed yoga and martial arts studios and analyzing the location patterns of organizations that define themselves in more explicit terms. Still, even among the numerous (over 60,000) and evenly distributed (similar to New Con churches) organizations included in the “sports and recreation facility” heading, more include “martial arts,” “karate,” or “tae kwon do” in their names (about 900) than “yoga” (about 250). Of course, we cannot determine from these data how many general fitness businesses (such as Gold’s Gym) or city parks and recreation centers include yoga or some martial art. It may be the case that yoga is more likely to penetrate into less educated and religiously conservative neighborhoods through such avenues, even as the more “devotional” variants meet stronger cultural resistance. This would be consistent with our theorizing but testing this proposition is a task for future work.

12Though we refer to the conventional term “zip codes” in the text, technically we are analyzing U.S.-Census-defined ZCTAs.
trends from 1990 to 2010, which are in general consistent with the trends we observe from 2000 to 2010. We also investigate relative associations among the different organizational types with levels and changes in aggregate zip code racial diversity, measured as a racial entropy variable. We calculate racial entropy for 2000 and 2010 Census data, and analyze both 2000 diversity and the difference between 2000 and 2010. Racial entropy ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 represents complete racial homogeneity, with the entire zip code population of a single race, and 1 represents maximal diversity, with a perfectly even distribution of individuals across the various Census racial categories.

To account for other factors potentially influencing the location of organizations, we use negative binomial regression models that include additional Census variables: total county population (to account for general opportunities afforded by organizations being located in big cities), median county rent (as a proxy for cost of living in the area around a given locality), zip code population density, and median zip code rent (to account for neighborhood affordability). We use negative binomial models because our dependent variables are count variables, for instance, the total number of yoga studios listed in a zip code. We also include one other zip-code-level variable, total establishments in our database, to account for the possibility that any links between local organizations and population groups are due to those organizations simply being located in amenity-rich zones. To these we also add the rate at which a county voted for George W. Bush in 2000, as a proxy for the area’s overall political orientation, since this may account for the supply of and demand for local organizations (voting records are only available at the county level).

To assess our hypotheses, we begin from descriptive statistics and work up to multivariate analyses. We first compare the total number and national distributions of our organizational variables, as well as their regional distributions and intercorrelations with one another. We then join the organizational variables with Census data and examine the racial and educational characteristics of the zip codes in which they are most numerous. National bivariate correlations between organizations and residential characteristics follow. Finally, we estimate multiple negative binomial regression models to give a multivariate account of the different qualities that characterize zip codes in which New Con, yoga, martial arts, and pop culture organizations are typically located.

This analytical approach makes a number of methodological assumptions. We assume a substantive connection between local suppliers and consumers—that local organizations derive many of their members/consumers from area (i.e., zip code) residents. This may not always be the case. McRoberts (2003) demonstrates that African Americans, especially middle-class ones, often attend churches outside the neighborhoods in which they live. This raises the issue of “catchment area,” or the zone from which an organization attracts its members/customers. It is an important area of ongoing research, and pursuing it would likely deepen and refine the results presented here. Still, the growing literature on places and amenities, including our own below, demonstrates strong linkages between local residential demographics and organizational configurations. Our key organizational categories are not randomly distributed, but are linked with distinct community characteristics, a finding and approach rooted in a century of community

13 One relatively straightforward way to investigate the issue is to compare county and zip-code-level variables. We did this with our New Con index, constructing a measure of the county average number of New Con churches per zip code, and explored multilevel models. In line with McRoberts’s (2003) research, independent of New Con churches at the zip-code level, nonwhite populations are higher and growing in counties with numerous New Con churches. At the same time, the connection between New Con churches and nonwhites at the zip-code level persists, even accounting for the county-level variable. Similarly, we find higher percentages of college graduates in counties with numerous yoga studios, even as the strong zip code association between yoga studios and college graduates persists.

14 Potentially, a New Con church may actively recruit only or mainly white Americans in a racially diverse area. The literature, however, shows many churches that do actively recruit all races in their neighborhoods (e.g., Marti 2009; Yi 2009), and this is consistent with survey data on interracial worship (Yi 2009; Yi and Graziul 2012). As we see below,
Table 1: New Con and low pop are the most numerous and broadly distributed organizations; yoga has the fewest organizations and most concentrated distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yoga</td>
<td>4523</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Con churches</td>
<td>91071</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martial arts</td>
<td>16343</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop culture</td>
<td>16464</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline churches</td>
<td>72721</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist churches</td>
<td>64826</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic churches</td>
<td>23165</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table shows the national sum, mean, and kurtosis for seven types of organizations: new conservative churches, popular culture, yoga, martial arts, mainline churches, Baptist churches, and Catholic churches. N = all U.S. zip codes (42,189). Source: http://www.superpages.com.

and neighborhood research, which consistently shows that core social processes (from crime and poverty to collective efficacy, organizational density, and civic activity) differ sharply across neighborhoods (even within the same city) in ways that endure through time and shape the experiences and life chances of residents, despite persistent claims about impending “placelessness” and “death of distance.”

While we treat organizations as dependent variables, we do not take a strong theoretical stand on which comes first, organizations or people. We recognize the dual dynamics of supply and demand in the distribution of particular organizations. Religious organizations compete both with one another and with other spiritual, cultural, and entertainment organizations for people’s time, money, attention, and commitment (Warner 1993; Collins 2008). At the same time, even if many cultural suppliers actively compete for the allegiance of potential participants, demand for such organizations is segmented by manifold divisions such as ethnicity, education, language, class, region, and lifestyle (Chaves and Gorski 2001; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Cultural providers, especially those with universalistic ambitions, actively work to engage a broad audience; cultural consumers look for distinct qualities in provider organizations. Each influences the other.

**Analysis**

With these various caveats in mind, we now assess our hypotheses about the distribution of local organizations, beginning with Table 1.

Table 1 shows the national total, mean, and kurtosis for our four main types of organizations: New Conservative churches, pop culture, yoga, and martial arts, as well as for Catholic, mainline, and Baptist churches. Their numbers and distribution are largely in line with our hypotheses. New Con and pop culture organizations are the most numerous, with about 3.9 pop culture and 2.2 New Con listings per zip code; pop culture has the flattest national distribution.\(^{15}\) Yoga studios are the least numerous and most concentrated (highest kurtosis). Martial arts clubs are far more

the literature on New Con, yoga, and martial arts practitioners is generally consistent with their organizations' spatial distributions.

\(^{15}\)The large number of New Con churches relative to their membership base underscores how these types of churches tend to be small enterprises, often with relatively few members, operating in a pluralistic, competitive environment. They are, so to speak, the small businesses of churches: fewer total members and more total organizations, just as there are more small firms in America than large corporations, but the latter have more employees. The strongly “spiky” spatial arrangement of Catholic churches likely reflects diocesan control over church locations and not only or primarily “local market demand” conditions, that is, the number of Catholic residents.
evenly distributed around the country than yoga (and similar to New Con and mainline churches; Catholic churches are more concentrated). In general, “God” and “karate” seem to be spread more evenly around the country than yoga, with popular culture (predictably) showing the broadest reach.

Looking at regional distributions helps to further examine where these organizations are typically located, as in Figure 1.

Figure 1 shows the average number of listings per zip code for these same organizational types in each major U.S. region: the South, West, Midwest, and Northeast. Pop culture is highest in the West and lowest in the Midwest. New Con is high in the South and Midwest, but its historically less-established “new line” aspect shows in its high levels in the West and its lower numbers in the Northeast. Baptist churches, by contrast, are highest in the South and low in the West. Mainline are strongest in the Midwest, lowest in the West, and higher than New Con and Baptist in the Northeast. Martial arts and yoga are both highest in the West and Northeast, which is consistent with their status as “imports” into the more cosmopolitan “coastal” regions, though martial arts have a stronger presence than yoga does in the Midwest and South.

It is also worth noting that many of the highest scoring individual zip codes fit theoretical expectations. The top New Con zip codes are mostly in the South (e.g., Memphis; Fayetteville, North Carolina; Fort Lauderdale) and in predominantly African-American and Hispanic areas of big cities (e.g., Chicago’s Cottage Grove Heights, South Central Los Angeles, South Dallas); the top zip codes for yoga include college towns (Boulder, Ann Arbor) and “hippie enclaves” (Santa Fe), as well as some hip metropolitan neighborhoods (e.g., Lincoln Park, Chicago; Chelsea, New York). The top martial arts zip codes include Chelsea and Boulder, but also downtown Atlanta (72 percent black), Honolulu (mostly Asian), and Rancho Cucamonga outside Los Angeles (mostly white but rising Asian and Hispanic). The top three zip codes for pop culture span downtown Atlanta, Manhattan, and Branson, Missouri (home of Dolly Parton’s “Dixie Stampede”).

These different distributions suggest that the organizational types are differentially correlated with one another. Table 2 shows that this is indeed the case.

The correlations shown in Table 2 are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations. Pop culture shows the highest average correlation with the other organizational types, followed by mainline churches and martial arts. Yoga and New Con have the lowest correlation of any two types, but they are not negatively correlated; the divide is not absolute. While the martial arts are more strongly correlated with yoga than New Con, martial arts are more strongly correlated with both yoga and New Con than either (yoga, New Con) is with the other. Yoga has the lowest
Table 2: Intercorrelations of New Con, mainline, yoga, pop culture, and martial arts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yoga</th>
<th>Mainline</th>
<th>New Con</th>
<th>Martial arts</th>
<th>Pop culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yoga</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline churches</td>
<td>.280</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Con churches</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>.626</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martial arts</td>
<td>.456</td>
<td>.452</td>
<td>.393</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop culture</td>
<td>.425</td>
<td>.679</td>
<td>.637</td>
<td>.697</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: This table shows Pearson correlations of New Con, mainline, yoga, pop culture, and martial arts with one another. All correlations are statistically significant at the \( p < .001 \) level. \( N = \) all U.S. zip codes.*

Table 3: College graduates and non-Hispanic white residents in America’s top zip codes for New Con churches, mainline churches, yoga studios, martial arts clubs, and pop culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Con (458)</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline (402)</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop culture (438)</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martial arts (449)</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoga (440)</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. U.S. zip code</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: This table shows the percentages of non-Hispanic white and college-graduate residents for 1990, 2000, and 2008–2012 in approximately the top 450 U.S. zip codes for New Con churches, mainline churches, yoga studios, martial arts clubs, and pop culture (\( Ns \) for each organizational type are in parentheses).*

correlation with pop culture, and martial arts the highest, followed somewhat closely by mainline and then New Con, though all do overlap with pop culture to a considerable extent. Yoga also has the lowest correlation with mainline churches. Martial arts are considerably more likely to overlap with mainline, while mainline and New Con are the most likely to be co-located. All in all, yoga appears to have the lowest spatial overlap (among these organizations) with American popular and formal religious culture, while martial arts and popular culture are the most likely to be present in places with both “God” (New Con) and “yoga.”

Next, we examine the typical racial and educational compositions of zip codes with many of these local organizations (see Table 3). Looking first at just their top zip codes (about 450), differences stand out sharply. Those with the most yoga or New Con churches are at the extremes: the former is the most white and college educated, the other the least. In the top New Con zip codes (at least 23 New Con churches), the white percentage of the population in the 2008–2012 American Community Survey estimate was over 31 points lower than in the top yoga zip codes (at least three yoga studios). By contrast, in the top yoga zip codes, the college graduate share of the population was almost 30 points higher than in the New Con zip codes. The racial gap, and especially the education gap, widened between 1990 and 2010.

On the other hand, top mainline (at least 14), martial arts (at least six clubs), and pop culture (at least 37) zip codes average in the middle: more college-graduate residents than the top New Con zip codes, more nonwhite residents than the top yoga zip codes. Among the three types of zip codes, martial arts stands out in having (by 2008–2012) both the highest college graduates and the highest nonwhite percentage. Moreover, the nonwhite percentage of the population increased more in the top martial arts zip codes than in the top zip codes for all other organization types,
Table 4: Correlations of race and education with yoga, New Con, martial arts, pop culture, mainline, Catholic, and Baptist churches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yoga</td>
<td>.178</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>-.068</td>
<td>-.052</td>
<td>.345</td>
<td>.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Con</td>
<td>.379</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>-.371</td>
<td>-.150</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>-.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martial arts</td>
<td>.329</td>
<td>.150</td>
<td>-.160</td>
<td>-.214</td>
<td>.329</td>
<td>.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>-.143</td>
<td>-.121</td>
<td>.210</td>
<td>.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>-.287</td>
<td>-.056</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>-.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>-.141</td>
<td>-.091</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop culture</td>
<td>.411</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>-.236</td>
<td>-.241</td>
<td>.321</td>
<td>.034</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table shows Pearson correlations of seven types of organizations with levels and changes of racial diversity, the non-Hispanic white percentage of the population, and the college-graduate percentage of the population. Changes are the differences between 2010 and 2000 levels (e.g., 2010 non-Hispanic white percentage of the population – 2000 non-Hispanic white percentage of the population); for college graduates we use the 2008–2012 American Community Survey estimates. All correlations are statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level. N = all U.S. zip codes.

starting at 1990 levels similar to the top mainline zip codes but then opening up a 7 percentage point gap.

The patterns we see among the top New Con, yoga, martial arts, and pop culture zip codes are characteristic of national configurations, as Table 4 indicates. Table 4 shows national Pearson correlations of our four main organizational types, as well as Baptist, Catholic, and mainline churches, with zip code, race, and educational characteristics. We again see distinct distributions. Though positively correlated with racial diversity, consistent with our hypotheses, yoga studios are the most weakly correlated with overall racial diversity in 2000; they were among the least correlated with increases in racial diversity in the 2000s, and they had the lowest correlation with levels and changes in nonwhite residents. At the same time, yoga shows the highest correlations with college-graduate levels and increases. By contrast, New Con churches are highly associated with racial diversity and show the highest correlation with nonwhite residents. Yet their correlations with levels and changes in college-graduate residents are the lowest (along with Baptist churches).

Pop culture and martial arts are in the middle. Pop culture shows the highest correlation with racial diversity (New Con is second and martial arts is third). Martial arts and pop culture, moreover, have the strongest correlations with increases in racial diversity and nonwhite residents. Nevertheless, they are associated with college graduates too, at a level similar to that of yoga, and greater than all the church types we examined. These correlations again fit our theoretical expectations.

Overall, from 1990 to 2010, U.S. zip codes became less white and more college educated. Zip codes with many New Con, yoga, martial arts, or pop culture organizations followed these general trends, but they were less white than the average zip code. Other factors, such as total establishments, population, and density, may explain this gap. We thus move to multiple regression

---

16Meng tests confirm that the correlation of yoga with diversity differs to a statistically significant degree from the correlations of martial arts, New Con, and pop culture with diversity. Such tests also confirm that the correlation of New Con with education is significantly weaker than are the correlations of martial arts, yoga, and pop culture.
Table 5: Negative binomial regression analyzing relationships between race and education with New Con, yoga, martial arts, and pop culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Con</td>
<td>Yoga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population (county)</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (zip code)</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>-.042**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median gross rent (county)</td>
<td>-.122***</td>
<td>.309***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican share of presidential vote (county)</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>-.306***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median gross rent (zip code)</td>
<td>-.051***</td>
<td>.333***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total establishments</td>
<td>.952***</td>
<td>.738***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial diversity</td>
<td>.398***</td>
<td>-.092***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in racial diversity</td>
<td>.077***</td>
<td>.083***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% non-Hispanic white</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in % non-Hispanic white</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
Table 5:  (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Con</td>
<td>Yoga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population (county)</td>
<td>.032**</td>
<td>.026†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (zip code)</td>
<td>.049***</td>
<td>-.061***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median gross rent (county)</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.291***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican share of presidential vote (county)</td>
<td>.019†</td>
<td>-.225***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median gross rent (zip code)</td>
<td>.139***</td>
<td>-.051†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total establishments</td>
<td>1.118***</td>
<td>.669***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% non-Hispanic white</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in % non-Hispanic white</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage college graduates</td>
<td>-.369***</td>
<td>.576***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in % college graduates</td>
<td>-.153***</td>
<td>.131***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2000 to 2008/12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table shows coefficients from a negative binomial regression analyzing relationships between race and education with New Con, yoga, martial arts, and pop culture establishments. Unless otherwise noted, years are 2000 and changes are the difference between 2000 and 2010 levels (e.g., 2010 non-Hispanic white percentage of the population - 2000 non-Hispanic white percentage of the population). All independent variables were standardized to mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1. N = all U.S. zip codes. †p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
analyses to account for variables potentially influencing associations between these organizations and local racial and educational characteristics.

Table 5 summarizes results from four negative binomial regression models. In each model, we analyze our four key organizational types separately as dependent variables. Model 1 includes the variables discussed above (population, density, rent, total establishments, voting), and then adds level and change in racial diversity. Models 2 and 3 begin from the same controls, but add instead levels and changes in non-Hispanic whites and college graduates, respectively. Model 4 includes the non-Hispanic white and college graduate variables together, to examine the relative importance of each.

The regression models largely confirm the picture that emerged from the simple bivariate correlations, with some additional information. Model 1 again shows the difference between yoga and New Con in terms of racial diversity; indeed, once we take the other variables in the model into account, yoga is negatively associated with racial diversity. In Model 1, moreover, the positive associations of martial arts and pop culture with high and growing racial diversity persist. Models 2 and 3 also suggest that the correlations we found between whites, college graduates, and our key organizational types are not explained by the other variables in the model. Nearly all remain statistically significant, and the educational disparity between yoga and New Con areas continues to stand out sharply. The small coefficients for pop culture and education in Model 3 suggest that pop culture amenities may be the least associated with strong educational differences.

Including education and race together in Model 4 does not alter the overall picture. For instance, the negative association between martial arts and changes in the non-Hispanic white share of the population persists, accounting for the fact that martial arts clubs tend to be in zip codes with high and increasing college-graduate population shares. Similarly, the negative associations of white and college-graduate residents with New Con churches are significant, accounting for one another. Yoga in Model 4 does show a small negative association with changes in non-Hispanic whites, suggesting that the positive association in Model 2 may be due to trends among college graduates, as yoga studios tend to be located in places where college graduates increased by large amounts. Popular culture is likely to be both in highly educated, nonwhite, and increasingly diversifying neighborhoods.

**Discussion and Conclusions**

Our theories and findings highlight the complex, competing patterns of division and inclusion in American culture, as evidenced by the location patterns of culturally significant organizations. In the past half-century, American Christians have restructured along left-right lines and become part of a diverse spiritual landscape. We add that the direction in which these processes unfold seems to depend on a distinct logic of framing. In some cases, the newer spiritual options, especially yoga, are widely defined as antithetical to orthodox Christianity and thus tend to reinforce social cleavages along religion, race, and class. As evidence for this process, we showed that spatial location of New Con churches and yoga studios differ along racial and educational lines, and the gap became wider in the 1990s and 2000s. In other cases, organizations are able to define themselves according to more commonly accepted, neutral frames and to attract participants from a wide variety of social groups. As we saw, compared to yoga and New Con, martial arts, sports clubs, and other popular culture organizations are shared across a greater variety of neighborhoods.

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17We highlight race and education in the text, but the other variables in our models also provide interesting information about the places in which these organizations are typically located. For instance, as we see in Model 4, New Con stands out as being most likely to be in smaller counties. We also explored other variables of potential theoretical importance, such as median age (not shown). New Con, martial arts, and pop culture tend to be in relatively young zip codes, while yoga is not related to age. Age, however, did not alter our main findings.
Our findings provide insight into a specific period, and the new century offers new possibilities. Frames are continually constructed and contested. To the extent that Christians and yogis find common ground and shared activities, they become more likely to overcome negative stereotypes and to reach diverse races, classes, and religious sensibilities. We see some evidence of such a process unfolding. The leading student evangelical organization, Intervarsity Christian Fellowship, generally eschews culture war issues, and promotes an active program of multiracial, social justice (e.g., tutoring inner-city students). Concurrently, yoga volunteers share exercises with public students and prison inmates alike (Hill 2010; Schware 2012).

If Christians and yogis overcome negative stereotypes and reach diverse groups, the spatial locations of New Con churches and yoga studios would then become less distinct. Framing is a crucial mechanism to understand the American spiritual landscape and to analyze the ongoing processes of religious restructuring and pluralism. Americans, individually and collectively, shape how we relate to each other and to our core traditions. Further research as to how and why organizations are distributed across local communities offers a promising agenda for students of American culture.

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